“the trouble with the
world is that the stupid are cocksure and the intelligent are full of
doubt" --Bertrand Russell
While watching Wimbeldon
a couple of years ago I thought to myself "that doesn't look so hard; I bet
I could do that."
But I caught myself
in a moment of reflection and asked myself whether, in reality, I could. To put
it bluntly, I have as much chance at success as the proverbial snowball on the
ferry across the Styx. I can count the number of times that I have picked up a
tennis racket on one hand.
With that in mind,
why would I watch the world’s elite tennis players and think that I could
somehow just pick up a racket and play like them?
My daughter is taking
guitar lessons. When she started she thought that it looked really easy. But
each time she learns something new, she realizes how much more there is that
she doesn't yet know.
It turns out that
this is a widespread psychological phenomenon known as the Dunning-Kruger
Effect (Kruger & Dunning, 1999). When we lack knowledge of a subject or
skill, we lack the wherewithal to know how much more there is to know.
Dunning-Kruger tells us that the less we know about something, the less we
realize just how ignorant we are. When we don't know, we don't know what it is that
we don't know. The more we know, the more we realize how much more there is to
know.
With regards to my
tennis potential, I lacked sufficient knowledge/skill to accurately assess my
incompetence. I was, in short, too stupid to realize I was stupid.
If one is not aware of
a deficit in knowledge or skill, it follows that it is all too easy to be
overconfident in one’s knowledge or skill. In the words of Dunning and Kruger:
“This overestimation occurs, in part, because people who are unskilled in these
domains suffer a dual burden: Not only do these people reach erroneous
conclusions and make unfortunate choices, but their incompetence robs them of
the metacognitive ability to realize it.”
If nothing compels
you to see where you are wrong, a default position is to presume you are right.
A child who has not learned of the reasons to reject a belief in Santa can be
quite confident in telling her father that he is mistaken in not believing in
Father Christmas. The child’s confidence in rejecting her parent’s assertion is
a function of the child’s ignorance. Being unaware of further possible
information that could shake her confidence, it seems inconceivable to her that
she could be mistaken.
You see this
frequently with introductory ethics or logic students. Students almost
invariably presume that they are above average in their moral reasoning and critical
thinking skills. Yet as they study logic and ethics, they inevitably realize
that their skills were lacking, and that there are many ways in which to
improve.
Like hundreds of
thousands before and after me, a few decades ago I spent two years on an LDS proselytizing
mission. I was quite fond of "bible bashing," as they say, because I
knew, beyond a shadow of a doubt, that my cherished beliefs were correct.
If you had asked that
missionary version of myself to rate my certainty that the claims of Mormonism
were literally true, I would have confidently asserted that I was “100%
certain.” Not that I “thought.” Not that I “was confident.” Not that I
“believed.’
I “knew.”
But how? How did I know?
LDS epistemology (a
term I had never heard prior to the mission) told me that my feelings were
accurate detectors of truth, and that the elimination of doubt was the same
thing as knowledge (Ether 3: 19; Alma 32: 40-41). Not knowing any alternative
theories of truth, I could be 100% certain that the LDS theories of knowledge
and truth detection were 100% accurate.
Such confidence can create
a convincing illusion of correctness. It is true that being more informed and
more knowledgeable increases the probability that one will draw correct
conclusions. The more one is informed, the more confidence can be placed in ones
opinions. Consequently, it is a short step of (fallacious) reasoning to presume
that because an individual expresses confidence in her opinions, she must
therefore be well informed, and is more likely to be correct. However, just because
B follows from A, that is no guarantee that a specific instance of B was caused
by A. If whenever it rains (A), your lawn gets wet (B), that doesn’t mean that
every time your lawn is wet (B), you can conclude that it rained (A). There can
be other explanations for the wet lawn—like your sprinkler system. Likewise, being
informed (A) leads to confidence in conclusions (B), but confidence in
conclusions can be accounted for by something other than being well informed—like
the Dunning-Kruger effect.
So is it any wonder
that they sent us out to teach Mormonism at an immature 19 years old? It was 21
years old for the Sisters at the time. Current missionaries are even younger:
18 for the young men, and 19 for the young ladies. At that age we are disturbingly
undereducated. Had I studied even a small amount comparative religion, logic,
psychology, anthropology, neurophysiology, epistemology...or practically any
academic discipline at all… I would have realized how profoundly ignorant I
really was, and how foolish I appeared to those I was trying to convince with
my confidence. I sincerely believed that my bold confidence would be the
deciding factor in the conversion of my investigators, when in reality, to the
educated, my bold confidence was as convincing as that of the little girl who
scolds her Father for not believing in Santa.
As a young
uninformed, undereducated missionary, I could testify with bold certainty
because I was too stupid to know that I was stupid.
On a related note, is
it any wonder that our friends and family members hardly ever ask us why we
have left the Church. For many of them, maintaining a strategic level of
ignorance with regards to LDS history and theology allows them to maintain
their confidence (i.e. faith) in the institution.
Kruger, J., &
Dunning, D. (1999). Unskilled and Unaware of it: How Difficulties in
Recognizing One’s Own Incompetence Lead to Inflated Self-Assessments. Journal
of Personality and Social Psychology, 77 (6): 1121-34.
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